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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000121

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, CA/VO  
NA-243-GOOREVICH  
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN  
OSD FOR TAYLOR  
COMMERCE FOR SHEPPARD

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [AORC](#) [KNNP](#) [IAEA](#) [ENRG](#) [TRGY](#) [CVIS](#)

SUBJECT: IAEA: DISCUSSION WITH IAEA ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S.  
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

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Summary  
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1. (SBU) Officials of the United States Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met in Vienna on March 3, 2009, to discuss matters related to the implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. IAEA officials confirmed that the Agency was prepared for the United States to purchase equipment to be used during complementary access visits, as well as to work with U.S. officials on equipment management procedures (authentication, storage, delivery to/from sites, preventive maintenance, replacement of defective equipment, etc.).

2. (SBU) The Agency agreed to provide electronically an up-to-date list of Agency inspectors designated to the United States, and to make arrangements with the Office of External Relations to try to ensure that regular updates are provided, also electronically, to the U.S. Mission. Additionally, the IAEA agreed to clarify if the IAEA Additional Protocol Reporter software could include a mechanism for reporting mines as "suspended", and to share its experience with the United States on performing complementary access at mines. In response to questions by the U.S. Delegation, the IAEA agreed to investigate and inform the United States: (i) if information on the export of nuclear grade graphite for non-nuclear end-use was required; and (ii) if there was any difference between the information provided under the VRS and that required under the AP. Under Article 2.a.(ix), the Agency may request information on imports of items enumerated in Annex II of the AP by the United States. IAEA officials indicated that complementary access visits to importing locations might be useful in confirming NNWS quarterly export declarations. The United States committed to propose Agenda items for the bilateral consultations in April and to make arrangements for site visits requested by the IAEA. Funding for IAEA safeguards activities in the United States would also be addressed in the April bilateral meeting. Also at the April meeting, the U.S. team agreed to clarify communications channels. Comment: UNVIE is prepared to host a computer in the secure area to ensure that the U.S. Mission remains in the loop on all communications. End comment and summary.

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Introductory Comments  
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3. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B Director Herman Nackaerts welcomed this first round of discussions on the implementation of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP), something he had been requesting for some time. He stated the IAEA is interested

in learning the tools/procedures for use under the U.S Additional Protocol, the delegation of responsibilities within the U.S. Government on matters related to the Additional Protocol, communication channels, and any constraints that the United States might have on IAEA activities under the Additional Protocol. IAEA Principal Legal Officer Laura Rockwood underscored that the text of the U.S. AP is identical to the APs undertaken by the non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. She noted that it is important, in this regard, that the U.S. not adopt an interpretation of its obligations regarding its civil nuclear fuel cycle that would be at odds with how the same provisions were applied to the civil fuel cycle of NPT non-nuclear weapon states parties.

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Selection of the Louisiana Enrichment Services Centrifuge Facility  
for the Application of IAEA Safeguards  
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¶4. (SBU) Nackaerts stated that the IAEA was nearing a decision on the selection of the Louisiana Enrichment Services (LES) Centrifuge Facility for the application of IAEA safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, although no final decision has been made. Nackaerts said the preliminary thinking is to explore ways to use LES for developing novel/alternative safeguards approaches as alternatives to traditional safeguards approaches, for possible eventual use in NNWS. He indicated that selection of LES for the application of IAEA safeguards would depend upon what constraints the U.S. might seek to impose at the facility. As an aside, Nackaerts recalled that the Director General (DG) had determined that the IAEA did not have a legal obligation under the Hexapartite Safeguards Project to apply safeguards on this facility. (Comment: The IAEA seemed be motivated to select LES over the Lead Cascade at Portsmouth, based on the fact that LES employed URENCO technology,

which was utilized around the world, whereas the Lead Cascade employed U.S. technology, which had not been proliferated. End Comment.)

¶5. (SBU) Nackaerts also expressed interest in learning more about the SILEX enrichment facility. U.S. participant Steve Adams (ISN/MNSA) noted that this facility had not been placed on the eligible facilities list. Nackaerts requested that this facility be discussed during the April bilateral consultations in the United States.

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U.S. Actions Related to the Additional Protocol  
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¶6. (SBU) Adams briefly reviewed the U.S. national security exclusion and highlighted actions taken by the U.S. Executive and Legislative Branches necessary to bring the AP into force. Adams stated that the responsibility for U.S. implementation of the AP was shared among the U.S. interagency community, as follows: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) was responsible for activities that take place on DOD-owned, operated or leased locations; (2) the Department of Energy (DOE) was responsible for activities that take place on DOE-owned, operated or leased locations; (3) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was responsible for activities that take place at NRC-licensed locations, except at DOE and DOD locations; and (4) the Department of Commerce (DOC) was responsible for activities that take place at locations not covered by DOE or NRC. Department of Defense installations, however, will neither be declared nor are subject to inspection by the IAEA.

¶7. (SBU) Adams stated that DOE had promulgated all required internal rule making as well as manuals and handbooks on the AP in the DOE complex. DOE had submitted its draft declaration to DOC. DOC had collected and processed industry submissions, and aggregated all agency information collected from declarations into a U.S. national declaration for transmission to the IAEA. DOC promulgated its final rule on October 31, 2008. DOC was working jointly with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on a data collection system. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was responsible for activities that take place at NRC-licensed locations, except at DOE and DOD locations. NRC revised its regulations to incorporate U.S. IAEA Additional Protocol requirements (December 23, 2008). NRC had provided pertinent information to NRC licensees at several

industry-related meetings.

¶18. (SBU) Adams confirmed that the United States would submit its first quarterly export report on May 30, 2009. By late April, the U.S., in order to meet its domestic legal requirements, will submit its initial declaration under the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to Congress for a 60-day review process. The approved declaration will be transmitted to the IAEA by July 2, 2009, in order to meet the 180-day requirement for such declarations under the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol.

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Frequency of Inspections  
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¶19. (SBU) Adams requested that the Agency provide the U.S. with informal views regarding the likely frequency of inspections in the U.S. In this regard, the U.S. is interested in learning from the Agency whether it had conducted any complementary access visits in France or the United Kingdom. He asked how soon the U.S. could expect its first complementary access visit after submission of the initial declaration by the United States. Nackaerts responded that the U.S. could expect to see a modest inspection effort, i.e., no more than five complementary access visits per year during the first two years. These accesses would undoubtedly be sought in connection with activities that the United States had with non-nuclear weapon states Party to the NPT or in an effort to better understand the U.S. declaration.

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Reliable Communications  
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¶110. (SBU) Adams noted that, as the U.S. had stated in previous bilateral consultations, it plans to use the United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) as the means through which it will receive and respond to IAEA notifications requesting complementary access, as well as for other related communications requiring rapid

turn-around. Adams noted that the U.S. would ask that the IAEA, at a minimum, to include the following information in its notifications of complementary access: (1) the identification of the location, site or facility for which complementary access was sought; (2) the purpose for the complementary access; (3) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or other location for which the complementary access sought; (4) the activities that will be carried out during the complementary access; (5) the time and date that the complementary access was expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by the complementary access; and (6) the names and titles of the inspectors.

¶111. (SBU) At the April meeting, Adams stated that the U.S. would like to discuss and agree with the IAEA on the format for inspection notifications, the technical specifications of the electronic communications system linking NRRC and IAEA, and logistical arrangements for setting it up. In the meantime, he noted that representatives from the NRRC who will be in Vienna in mid-March would like to review technical specifications of the electronic communication systems linking the NRRC and IAEA. Nackaerts questioned the value of a dedicated computer system for what might amount to very little activity in the U.S., but did not object to an eventual installation at the IAEA, assuming all technical arrangements could be worked out. Nackaerts asked that the April discussion clarify points of contact and communication channels.

¶112. (SBU) Mission Comment and Recommendation: While Ambassador supports making use of the NRRC for communications, we note it will be important to ensure that the U.S. Mission remains involved in all communications between the USG and the IAEA. We suggest that a computer terminal also be installed in the secure area at UNVIE (in addition to the computer that would be installed at the IAEA), to ensure that we receive copies of all relevant communications. End comment and recommendation.

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Through the AP, Article by Article  
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¶13. (SBU) Nackaerts stated that the IAEA had began discussing U.S. obligations under each article of the AP, beginning with Article 2, and hoped to use this discussion to identify questions and possible gaps in knowledge. Rockwood noted that the U.S.-IAEA AP was identical to APs adopted by non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, with the exception of the exclusion of instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the U.S. or to locations or information associated with such activities, and emphasized that, except where that exclusion was relevant, the provisions of the U.S.-IAEA AP would be interpreted in the same way as would other APs, using the same formulation for those provisions.

¶14. (SBU) Rockwood stated that Article 2.a.(i) was designed to complement information in INFCIRC 153-type agreements in order to give a complete picture of the nuclear fuel cycle-related activities in the state. Specifically, the state was required to report on all government or government-sponsored research and development in the nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA confirmed that, if it sought complementary access to a location declared pursuant to this article, it would require the IAEA to identify a question or ambiguity with the U.S. declaration, therefore, giving more than a 24 hour notice of IAEA interest in the location.

¶15. (SBU) Adams noted that such research and development in the United States was usually carried out at the bequest of the Department of Energy. NNSA/NA-243 official Joanna Sellen stated that the U.S. would provide the IAEA with information it could, focusing mainly on the joint work that the U.S. carries out with other states, especially NPT non-nuclear weapon state parties. She indicated DOE had done a thorough job of scrubbing its declaration, and was prepared, if necessary, to provide the IAEA access to the relevant principle investigators if access to the location itself was not possible.

¶16. (SBU) Rockwood noted that the Agency would only seek access to Article 2(a)(i) locations based on a question or inconsistency; as such, discussions of the matter would normally be required. USDOC's Jill Shepherd stated that the Department of Commerce was responsible for research and development at private companies and universities. DOC was principally concerned with the protection of confidential business information at such locations. As such, DOC was responsible for developing managed access plans to protect such information from inadvertent release.

¶17. (SBU) Adams noted that it went without saying that the U.S. would follow the terms of the subsidiary arrangement that had been negotiated with the IAEA. IAEA officials asked if the U.S. was requesting a new subsidiary arrangement. Adams stated that, while he did not preclude possibly seeking a subsidiary arrangement on other subjects, he did not expect there was a need for another subsidiary arrangement on managed access. When it was clear the IAEA side was unaware of the extant subsidiary arrangement, Adams provided the IAEA with a copy of the signed original document. Adams noted that subsidiary arrangement contained illustrative managed access techniques that were based largely upon standard managed access techniques used in other international treaty regimes, e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention.

¶18. (SBU) Rockwood stated that Article 2(a)(ii) was a catch-all provision, allowing the parties to agree upon measures that provide for the provision of additional information on operational activities that could enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards at facilities or locations outside of facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. Adams stated that the U.S. saw no need at this time to pursue measures under this provision.

¶19. (SBU) Rockwood raised Article 2(a)(iii), noting that this provision required the United States to provide general descriptions of each building on each site, including its use. Rockwood quoted the definition for a "site" in the AP. She stated that this provision basically required the United States to provide an annotated map identifying the location of all installations co-located at the facility. She added that that this provision directly addressed one of the shortfalls of the IAEA safeguards regime identified in the post-Gulf War era.

¶20. (SBU) IAEA Operations B Section Head Chris Charlier encouraged the U.S. to indicate managed access requirements in its Article 2.a.(iii) declarations. All necessary efforts have to be made on both sides so that the objectives/purposes of the complementary access are not compromised due to managed access. The Agency provided the U.S. with a copy of the standardized text for AP Subsidiary Arrangements.

¶21. (SBU) Adams responded that he believed that the U.S. position remained that it would declare such information only for sites on the facilities that the IAEA had selected for safeguards and for which it had provided design information. Adams added that he would research the historical U.S. position on this issue and would be prepared to speak authoritatively on it during the April bilateral meetings. Rockwood stated that the United States should be cautious, given the possibility that others (such as Iran) could use the U.S. position to justify a new interpretation of this provision that would, for example, allow it to avoid declaring information for facilities that it had not provided the IAEA with design information, such as the new Iranian reactor planned for Darkhovin. Rockwood added that it was important that the U. S. not exaggerate what was required under Article 2(a)(iii) - a map of the site would suffice

¶22. (SBU) Rockwood raised Article 2(a)(iv), noting that this provision required the U.S. to provide the IAEA information on the scale of operations for each location identified in Annex I. Rockwood stated that this provision was designed to give the IAEA key information about choke points in the State's nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA, however, could only seek access to such a site after raising a question or inconsistency with the State's declaration; therefore, access could not be expected to occur in less than 24 hours, and would only be during working hours. Adams agreed with this interpretation, noting that it was hard to see why the IAEA would seek access in the U.S. under this provision, unless it was for the purpose of learning information about an NPT non-nuclear weapon state's fuel cycle. Rockwood stated that the principal reason for safeguards in the nuclear weapon states was to demonstrate that the AP did not place the non-nuclear weapon states at a commercial disadvantage.

¶23. (SBU) Regarding Article 2(a)(v), Rockwood stated that the IAEA expected declarations regarding the status of the uranium mines and uranium and thorium concentration plants. Adams informed the Agency that DoC would be responsible for hard rock mines, while the NRC would be responsible for in situ solution mines and concentration plants. Specifically, the IAEA expected to be informed whether the location was "operating", "closed down" or "abandoned. Shepherd

stated that, in the U.S., mines could be operational, closed down, suspended or decommissioned, whereas the AP Reporter software did not provide a field for reporting "suspended" (operational but not operating) mines. The IAEA agreed to clarify whether the Protocol Reporter software could include a mechanism for reporting mines as "suspended", and to share its experience with the United States on performing complementary access at mines.

¶24. (SBU) Rockwood noted that, in accordance with Article 2.a.(vi), the U.S. was required to report inventories and exports to NNWS and alleged non-nuclear purposes of pre 34(c) [INFCIRC/153] material. Adams stated that the NRC was responsible for collecting information to be provided under this provision; however, the U.S. did not anticipate that many locations would have to be declared.

¶25. (SBU) Regarding Article 2.a. (vii), Rockwood and Adams agreed that no nuclear material had been exempted from safeguards under the U.S. VOA. The U.S. declaration under this provision would simply be "nothing to declare." Similarly, there was no intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high-enriched uranium or U-233 on which safeguards had been terminated under the U.S. VOA; therefore, the U.S. declaration under this provision likewise would be "nothing to declare."

¶26. (SBU) Rockwood stated that Complementary Access might be useful in confirming NNWS declarations about exports. Adams stated that the NRC and Commerce would be responsible for collecting information on exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II, as required by Article 2.a.(ix). The NRC will provide



information on exports of nuclear grade graphite for use in reactors. Shepherd asked whether information on exports of nuclear grade graphite for non-nuclear end-use was required. Adams asked whether exports of spare parts (e.g., parts for pumps reported already) was also required. The Agency agreed to research these issues and respond in April. UNVIE SciAtt Hilliard requested the Secretariat to clarify the differences between what the U.S. is currently reporting under the Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) and what is expected under the AP.

127. (SBU) In regard to Article 2.a. (x), Sellen stated that the Department of Energy would provide the Department of Commerce with information on general plans for the succeeding ten-year period, in particular on facilities that may be included in the list of eligible facilities. Sellen noted it is understood that enrichment and reprocessing plants may be included under this article. This information would be included in the U.S. declaration.

128. (SBU) Adams asked the extent to which information provided under the Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) coincided with that required under the U.S.-IAEA AP, and, if it was the same information, whether any action on the part of the U.S. would be necessary before the United States ceased reporting under the VRS. The Agency explained that, if the U.S. were to decide to stop reporting under the VRS, it would be advisable for the U.S. to inform the Agency officially. The Agency requested that information on exports be provided based on actual dates of exports and not based on the dates the export licenses were granted.

129. (SBU) Rockwood stated that, in accordance with Article 2.b.(i), if the U.S. had knowledge of any nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D not involving nuclear material information, it was required to make "best efforts" to declare it to the IAEA. Shepherd noted that the Department of Commerce regulations addressed this obligation, and are published in the Federal Register. It was anticipated that there may be a number of U.S. locations that could have such R&D. Rockwood explained that access to such locations could only be triggered by a question or an inconsistency, which would require prior consultation with the U.S.

130. (SBU) Rockwood noted that, in accordance with Article 2.b. (ii), the U.S. was required to make every reasonable effort to provide information to the Agency for locations outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of the site. She explained that it was, in the first instance, the State's prerogative to delineate site boundaries, this provision permitted the Agency to follow up with the State if it had reason to believe that the State had not included those buildings which are required under the AP to be included within the site. Given the U.S. exception for activities with direct national security significance, Rockwood acknowledged that this provision was not likely to be relevant.

131. (SBU) In accordance with Article 2.c, Rockwood stated that the U.S. was required to provide amplifications or clarifications of any information as requested by the Agency in so far as relevant for the purposes of safeguards. Nackaerts asked how such requests should be made to the U.S. Adams required that official Agency communications should be sent through the Permanent Mission of the United States to the IAEA in Vienna.

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DoD Concerns  
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132. (SBU) Nackaerts asked the United States to identify possible constraints in the implementation of the AP in the United States. He noted the discussions the previous week with a DOD team that had agreed to provide written procedures to facilitate the IAEA's understanding. OSD's Marc Taylor provided the background that the Department of Defense had concerns regarding the equipment to be used during complementary access visits, and that DoD facilities are located throughout the United States. He said the equipment procedures were designed to ensure that the IAEA equipment functioned as designed and was not capable of collecting information outside the scope of the Additional Protocol, and said a member of the Department of Defense would be part of the host team for complementary access visits. The sides agreed to discuss procedures

for use of the equipment during the next meeting.

¶33. (SBU) Nackaerts confirmed that complementary access (CA) would be sought during normal working hours, and that activities conducted during such access would be in accordance with Article 6. Nackaerts stressed the importance of the inspectors having access to the data collected during CAs, including transporting or transmitting data back to Vienna, in order to draw independent conclusions from its complementary access. Extra time may be required during complementary access to compile data from Agency equipment on site. Rockwood suggested the U.S. provide as much information beforehand on how it intended to manage inspector access.

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Inspection Equipment  
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¶34. (SBU) Adams recalled that the U.S. and IAEA had discussed in the past and agreed upon a concept for technical equipment inspection, and that a further informal discussion had taken place the week before on the equipment to be purchased. Nackaerts stated that Safeguards DDG Heinonen had confirmed the arrangement, e.g., that the United States would purchase such complementary equipment kits, which would be placed under Agency seal, and the U.S. would have them available for use by IAEA inspectors during complementary access visits. Nackaerts confirmed that the Agency would implement this measure, but identified a number of practical issues that had to be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. The Agency will authenticate each instrument in the kit before use. Adams stated that the United States would discuss its planned equipment management procedure (authentication, storage, delivery to/from sites, preventive maintenance, replacement of defective equipment, etc.) during the bilateral meeting in April. Nackaerts stated that it was important for the IAEA to be assured that it could remove notes and data, e.g., radiation measurements, from the location and return them to Vienna for analysis. He observed it might be necessary to build in additional time to conduct complementary access in the U.S., and also noted the need to redefine a bit the rationale for CA in the U.S., but agreed to try to walk through what a CA might entail at the April meetings.

¶35. (SBU) Taylor of OSD elaborated on the U.S. concern that the IAEA could tamper with the equipment and make it more sensitive than it was designed, or give it features that were inconsistent with the purpose of the IAEA's access. Rockwood warned that these procedures could set a bad precedent for complementary access within NPT non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those states where the IAEA has serious concerns about nuclear activities, and stressed the importance of the IAEA being equipped to do its job. In Rockwood's view, it was important to tie these measures to the national security exclusion.

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Environmental Sampling  
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¶36. (SBU) Taylor stated that the U.S. would check each site for information of direct national security significance to the U.S. before sampling would be allowed, and noted the President had to approve such sampling. Nackaerts responded that it sounded like a five-year process, if not longer. Rockwood stated that she had deep concerns about what the U.S. was proposing. She recognized that the U.S. could exclude information or activities of direct national security significance to the U.S., but expressed her concern about the interpretation of what constituted direct national security significance to the U.S. She questioned what would happen if other countries had such concerns and sought to use Article 7 managed access to exclude the Agency from doing its job. Rockwood stated that she understood that the U.S. was trying to protect signatures from its nuclear weapons program.

¶37. (SBU) Adams read Sections 252 and 253 of the "U.S. AP Implementation Act" of 2006. Under these provisions, the U.S. may not permit any wide-area or location-specific environmental sampling in the U.S., respectively, unless the President had determined and reported to Congress, among other things, that:

-- the proposed use of environmental sampling was necessary to increase the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear weapons state; and  
-- the proposed use of environmental sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities or information of direct national security significance.

¶38. (SBU) Rockwood stated that the U.S. policy on environmental sampling must not go beyond the national security exclusion, i.e., information or activities of direct national security significance to the United States.

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Visas for IAEA Inspectors  
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¶39. (SBU) Nackaerts underscored the need for the U.S. to provide one-year multiple entry visas to IAEA inspectors designated to the U.S. Adams stated that the U.S. would provide one-year multiple-entry visas to designated Agency inspectors. Hilliard noted that the U.S. did not get timely electronic notification of the full list of inspectors designated to the U.S. In order to expedite the visa issuing process and to facilitate quick access at the declared sites, Hilliard suggested that the Agency provide an up-to-date list of designated inspectors electronically to the U.S. on a regular basis.

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Draft Agenda for April Bilateral Consultations  
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¶40. (SBU) Both sides agreed that a follow-up meeting will be held in Washington, DC, during the week of 20 April 2009, and that the implementation of AP and the VOA will be the focus of this meeting. Time permitting; the safeguards approach for the MOX facility will be discussed. On the implementation of the AP, discussion topics will include: provision of information, including communication channels; implementation of CA and managed access; equipment for inspection/CA; resolution of questions and inconsistencies; protection and handling of confidential information; delineation of site boundaries; agency regulations implementing the AP; and environmental sampling. On the implementation of safeguards under the VOA, topics of discussion will include updated eligible facilities list; SQP amendments; de-selection of facilities; Y-12 status and future plans; U.S. plans for the MOX facility (Savannah River); U.S. plans for uranium enrichment; and U.S. plan for placing additional Pu under safeguards at KAMS. The United States also requested that the Agency give a presentation on its information security arrangements/measures and on safeguards measures at gas centrifuge enrichment facilities.

¶41. (SBU) Additionally, the sides agreed to discuss the budget for the implementation of safeguards in the United States at the April bilateral consultations. The U.S. stated that it might provide a briefing on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Nackaerts requested that the U.S. provide the IAEA delegation with a tour of the National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico. During that site visit, the IAEA would be prepared to begin discussing a possible safeguards approach, including development of alternative safeguards measures and novel technologies. The U.S. agreed to propose the agenda for the meeting in April.

¶42. (U) U.S. delegation members have cleared this cable. U.S. Delegation: Mr. Stephen Adams, DOS; Ms. Lisa Hilliard, UNVIE; Ms. Karen Henderson, NRC; Ms. Jill Shepherd, DOC; Ms. Joanna Sellen, DOE; Mr. Marc Taylor, OSD; Mr. Kurt Kessler, UNVIE.

IAEA personnel participating included: Mr H. Nackaerts, DIR-SGOB; Mr ¶C. Charlier, SH-OB3; Ms L. Rockwood, SH-NPPM, OLA; Mr W.S. Park, A/SH-OBC; Mr T. Bayou Temesgen, SIS-OB3; Mr T. Shigeto, CO-USA; Ms ¶S. Wilson, OBC.

SCHULTE